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SHOULD CHRISTIANS BE WORRIED  
ABOUT SITUATIONIST CLAIMS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
AND PHILOSOPHY?
Christian B. Miller
The situationist movement in psychology and, more recently, in philosophy 
has been associated with a number of striking claims, including that most 
people do not have the moral virtues and vices, that any ethical theory that is 
wedded to such character traits is empirically inadequate, and that much of 
our behavior is causally influenced to significant degrees by psychological in-
fluences about which we are often unaware. Yet Christian philosophers have 
had virtually nothing to say about situationist claims. The goal of this paper is 
to consider whether Christians should start to be worried about them.
Here are the results of a study of helping behavior by the psychologists 
Arnie Cann and Jill Blackwelder (1984):
Bathroom. In the control condition, 45% of people agreed to deliver some 
documents 40 meters away when approached in the hallway of a building. 
By contrast, 80% agreed to carry out the same task in the experimental con-
dition. The only difference was that these people had just exited a public 
bathroom.1
This is exactly the kind of study that so-called “situationists” in both psy-
chology and philosophy love to cite. And on the basis of dozens of studies 
like it, they tend to arrive at some rather bold conclusions. For instance, 
they tend to say that most people do not have any of the virtues (in this 
case the virtue of compassion), which includes the moral virtues, epistemic 
virtues, prudential virtues, and the like. And the same goes for the vices, 
too, like cruelty or cold-heartedness. Furthermore, they also tend to claim 
that much of our behavior is causally influenced, to significant degrees, 
by psychological influences about which we are often unaware (in this 
case, influences triggered by using the bathroom). All this is a significant 
departure from commonsense thinking about action. But situationists call 
for commonsense thinking to be revised.
The situationist movement first started in psychology in the 1960s and 
70s, launching what became a longstanding “person-situation debate” 
and, not surprisingly, calling into question widely-held assumptions 
1Cann and Blackwelder, “Compliance and Mood,” 224.
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about personality and indeed about the viability of the entire discipline of 
personality psychology. Meanwhile, philosophers started to really pay at-
tention to situationism only at the turn of the century, thanks in large part 
to the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. These two philosophers 
took the implications of situationism even further, arguing that any ethical 
theory that appeals to virtues like honesty or compassion is in serious 
trouble. Virtue ethics, especially of the neo-Aristotelian kind, was said to 
be particularly vulnerable.
Predictably, there has been a sizable literature responding to situ-
ationist claims in both psychology and philosophy. But at the same time 
there has been almost uniform silence on these matters from philosophers 
and theologians writing from an explicitly Christian perspective.2
There could be various reasons for this silence. Perhaps Christians in 
these fields have devoted their attention to more pressing issues, such as 
the problem of evil. Perhaps they have just overlooked the relevant em-
pirical research, as most philosophers tended to do for several decades. Or 
perhaps they are aware of the research and related controversies, but do 
not find them particularly troubling.
Regardless of the answer to this sociological question, the goal of 
this paper is to consider whether Christians should be concerned about 
claims being made in the situationist literature in either philosophy or 
psychology. More specifically, are there any reasons why Christians, qua 
Christians, should be concerned? It may turn out that all of us, whether 
religious or atheist, Christian or agnostic, should be worried about that 
literature. But here my focus is just on whether, given standard Christian 
commitments, Christians should be especially worried.
Unfortunately, the discussion will end up being complicated by the fact 
that there is no one claim or position that goes by the name “situationist.” 
So I will have to spend some time distinguishing various claims that are 
associated with the situationist label in both disciplines.
This is new ground that has not been trodden before, and so this paper 
will be largely exploratory in nature rather than arriving at definitive con-
clusions. It is divided into two main parts. The first considers the central 
claim made by situationists about what is not influencing our behavior, 
namely character traits like honesty and cowardice. The second part con-
siders the central claims made by situationists about what does typically 
influence our behavior, namely psychological dispositions the significant 
role of which will likely come as a surprise to us. The final section of the 
paper will try to bring these negative and positive claims together in 
2Indeed I could find only one article in a philosophy of religion or a theology journal 
which discusses situationism in any detail (Kim, “Have the Manicheans Returned?”). To 
be fair, some philosophers who also are Christians have written about situationism (e.g., 
Adams, A Theory of Virtue), but they have not done so from an explicitly Christian perspec-
tive. What they have said could have been written by a secular philosopher as well.
 Finally, it is worth clarifying that the situationist movement at issue in this paper bears no 
relation to the position in normative theory called “situation ethics” which was developed 
by, among others, Joseph Fletcher in the 1960s.
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evaluating some implications for how Christians should think about these 
matters.
1. The Negative Side of Situationism in Psychology and Philosophy
Let me start with situationism in psychology, and specifically with the 
central claim about traits that the situationist position is perhaps most 
famous for advocating:
(N1) There is a large body of experimental evidence that is incompat-
ible with the widespread possession of those character traits that 
are supposed to be stable over time in the same situations as well 
as consistent across relevant situations.3
Examples of such traits would range from moral traits like honesty and 
compassion to non-moral traits like open-mindedness, cleverness, ex-
traversion, and calmness. What they have in common is that they are 
psychological dispositions that are alleged to give rise to trait-relevant 
thoughts and/or action. Hence other things being equal, the trait of hon-
esty, when triggered, will give rise to honesty-relevant thoughts and 
feelings, which then in turn cause subsequent honest action. Furthermore, 
someone who has the trait of honesty is expected to reliably tell the truth 
when appropriate, both over time in the same situations, e.g., the court-
room (stability), and in a number of different relevant situations, e.g., the 
courtroom, office, and school (cross-situational consistency).
The evidence alluded to in (N1) comes in different forms, but the main 
focus has been on what, for situationists, is the heart of the matter—the 
alleged cross-situational consistency of many character traits.4 When it 
comes to stability of behavior over time in the same situations, for in-
stance, situationists typically admit that correlations are robust and often 
well above .30.5 Consistency across situations is a different matter. For 
instance, when scores for a group of participants on such questionnaires 
are related to their actual behavior, or when trait-relevant behavior in one 
particular situation is related to behavior in another situation, correlations 
are surprising low, rarely exceeding .30.6
3The following labels have been used in the psychology literature to describe these traits: 
(i) behavioral dispositions, (ii) psychological realities, (iii) causes of behavior, (iv) broad, 
(v) global, (vi) stable, (vii) cross-situationally consistent, (viii) situation- or context-free. For 
references to each of these labels and elaboration of what they mean, see Miller, Character and 
Moral Psychology, chapter 4. I have omitted these complexities in the interest of space.
4Mischel and Peake, “Beyond Déjà vu in the Search for Cross-Situational Consistency”; 
Wright and Mischel, “A Conditional Approach to Dispositional Constructs,” 1160; Mischel 
and Shoda, “A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality,” 247; and Shoda, “A Uni-
fied Framework for the Study of Behavioral Consistency,” 362.
5See Mischel, Personality and Assessment, 36, 282; Mischel, “Toward a Cognitive Social 
Learning Reconceptualization of Personality,” 253; Mischel and Peake, “Beyond Déjà vu,” 
732, 734–737; Wright and Mischel, “A Conditional Approach,” 1161–1162; Ross and R. Nis-
bett, The Person and the Situation, 101, 129; and Shoda, “A Unified Framework,” 365–366.
6For classic reviews and discussions that are commonly labeled “situationist,” see Pe-
terson, The Clinical Study of Social Behavior, Mischel, Personality and Assessment, and, later, 
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The same concern about cross-situational consistency carried over to 
the philosophy literature. As already mentioned, Gilbert Harman and 
John Doris were primarily responsible for elevating the prominence of 
situationism in philosophy at the turn of the century.7 However, unlike 
psychologists working in the 1960s and 70s, they have been more nar-
rowly focused on the moral virtues and vices, and their ultimate goal has 
been to advance a debate in normative ethical theory about the plausibility 
of Aristotelian virtue ethics.
Their main line of reasoning tends to proceed in two broad stages. First, 
they argue for an empirical conclusion roughly as follows:
(1) If there is widespread possession of the moral virtues (and vices) 
understood, at least in part, as cross-situationally consistent char-
acter traits, then systematic empirical observation using appropri-
ate psychology experiments will reveal most people acting virtu-
ously (or viciously) in a wide variety of situations relevant to the 
particular virtue (or vice) in question.8
(2) However, systematic empirical observation using appropriate psy-
chology experiments fails to reveal that most people act in this kind 
of way.
(3) Therefore, given the psychological evidence, we are justified in be-
lieving on the basis of that evidence that most people do not pos-
sess the moral virtues or vices.9
Thus the main focus of their argument is also on trait cross-situational 
consistency, and they claim that there is sufficient empirical evidence to 
conclude that most people are not consistently virtuous (or vicious) from 
one relevant situation to the next.
As evidence for their conclusion, Harman and Doris put less weight on 
the correlational research from psychology. Instead, they mainly appeal 
to the results of a variety of psychology experiments that examined par-
ticipants’ behavior in different morally relevant situations. Some of their 
favorite examples include:
Dime in the Phone Booth. Shoppers at a mall were observed using a 
phone booth, and as soon as they left the booth, a stranger (actually a 
confederate) would walk slightly ahead and to the side of them, and 
Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation.
7See Harman, “Moral Philosophy meets Social Psychology”; “The Nonexistence of 
Character Traits”; “Virtue Ethics without Character Traits”; Doris, “Persons, Situations, and 
Virtue Ethics”; Doris, Lack of Character; Doris, “Heated Agreement”; and Merritt, Doris, and 
Harman, “Character.” For an earlier discussion see Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality.
8See, e.g., Doris “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” 523n23.
9Something like this reconstruction seems to be what Doris has in mind in his “Persons, 
Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” 505–507, and Merritt et al., “Character,” 357–358. For a more 
extensive reconstruction of their argument, see Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, 
chapter 8.
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“accidentally” drop a folder full of papers. It turned out that finding a 
dime or not in the coin return slot of the phone booth seemed to make a 
significant difference (88 percent versus 4 percent) to whether a person 
would subsequently help to pick up these papers. There were replica-
tion problems with this study, but other studies on mood effects found 
a similar pattern.10
Lady in Distress. In Latané and Rodin’s classic 1969 “Lady in Distress” 
experiment, the main dependent variable was whether participants ex-
hibited any helping behavior after hearing a loud crash in the next room 
and a woman’s scream, followed by cries of pain resulting from a book-
shelf apparently having fallen on top of her. Participants alone in the next 
room helped 70 percent of the time, while a participant in the same room 
with an unresponsive confederate helped only 7 percent of the time.11
Obedience to Authority. In experiment 5, the most famous version of 
Stanley Milgram’s shock experiments, participants were told to admin-
ister a test to someone in another room, and for every wrong answer, 
they were to give increasingly severe electric shocks. The test taker was 
a confederate and the shocks were fake, but participants did not know 
this. Under pressure from an experimenter who was in the same room 
with the participant, 65 percent of participants inflicted apparently le-
thal 450-volt XXX shocks, and 80 percent gave shocks which were at 
least at the 270-volt level. This despite the fact that at 270 volts the test 
taker was heard making agonizing screams and demanding to be let 
out, with the pleas getting desperate and hysterical at higher levels.12
In all three cases, the relevant virtue is supposed to be compassion, and in 
all three cases we find a pattern of behavior that is not in line with what 
we would expect if most people instantiated that virtue.
In the second stage of their argument, Harman and Doris use the con-
clusion in (3) to assess the plausibility of Aristotelian virtue ethics, along 
with any other view in ethics that relies on cross-situationally consistent 
virtues and vices. While my concern in this paper is not with virtue ethics, 
it is worth examining in the next section of this paper whether any parallel 
concerns might carry over to how Christians tend to think about ethics.
2. Should Christians be Worried about the Negative Side of Situationism?
We have seen that situationists in both philosophy and psychology have 
advanced a claim about—at the very least—the absence of the moral 
10Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping,” 384–388. For more on some of 
the replication troubles that arose, as well as other mood effect studies, see Miller, Moral 
Character, chapter 4.
11Latané and Rodin, “A Lady in Distress,” 193–195 and Latané and Darley, The Unrespon-
sive Bystander, 60–63.
12For this and other shock experiments conducted by Milgram, see his Obedience to Au-
thority.
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virtues and vices in the characters of most people. Now whether such a 
claim is justified is of course open to lively debate. In my own case, I have 
argued at great length, using additional experimental evidence not often 
cited in this discussion, in support of the same conclusion about absent 
virtue and vice.13 Not everyone, of course, is going to be persuaded by 
these arguments.14 But for the sake of discussion here, let me provisionally 
accept this negative conclusion and see whether, assuming it is correct, 
there is anything problematic that follows for Christianity.
Before proceeding further, it is important to clear up one possible 
misunderstanding. I think we should readily acknowledge from the start 
that how situationists tend to conceive of character traits like compas-
sion is likely going to differ in various ways from how Aristotelian virtue 
ethicists tend to conceive of them. And both approaches will in turn also 
likely differ from Christian approaches to character as well. Furthermore, 
Christians disagree amongst themselves on important questions about 
character, such as whether virtues are only acquired by human beings 
or are sometimes infused by God, what the list of virtues should con-
tain, whether original sin precludes the possession of the virtues in the 
unredeemed, and so forth. These differences and disagreements matter 
because even if situationists are right that character traits as they conceive 
them are scarce, it would not follow that character traits as Christians (or as 
some Christians) conceive them are scarce.15
As a methodological observation this is certainly true. And it would be 
a long and messy task to try to sort through different Christian concep-
tions of character and see what bearing the experimental literature would 
have on each of them. Fortunately, though, we can bypass this task here. 
For as I have been careful to note, there is one particular feature of many 
character traits which has been the focus of attention for situationists, 
namely the cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behavior. Other 
issues—how they are supposed to be acquired, whether God can infuse 
them, whether they require appropriate motivation, and so forth—are 
secondary issues in this discussion. And regardless of the differences 
that exist among Christian conceptions of character, they almost always 
assume that the virtues and vices are going to be cross-situationally 
consistent in their manifestation.16 If that requirement isn’t met for most 
13See Miller, Moral Character and Character and Moral Psychology.
14For some of the leading responses to situationist interpretations of the empirical data, 
see Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character” and 
Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors.” For criticism of my own interpretation of the empirical 
data, see Bates, “Mixed Traits and Dispositions.” For an extensive catalog of the different 
responses that have been offered, see Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, chapter 8.
15Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
16Note that I take the cross-situational consistency requirement to apply to the virtues 
and the vices. Someone who has the vice of dishonesty to a high degree, for instance, would 
attempt to cheat others for his own advantage both regularly over time and also consistently 
across various situations such as paying his taxes, taking tests, and so forth (under certain 
conditions, such as when he thinks he can get away with it, the rewards are significant 
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people, then we have good reason to think, even from a Christian perspec-
tive, that most people do not have these traits.
So back, then, to the central question. Assuming for the sake of discus-
sion that most people do not have the moral virtues and vices, is that a 
conclusion that should worry Christians qua Christians? Perhaps Harman 
and Doris can provide us with some guidance here. In a 1998 paper Doris 
claims that, “Aristotelian virtue ethics, when construed as invoking a 
generally applicable descriptive psychology . . . [is] subject to damaging 
empirical criticism.”17 Here I think we get to the heart of the matter. Sup-
pose that, instead of Aristotelian virtue ethics, it turns out that Christianity 
is committed in some way to a descriptive account of our psychological 
lives that attributes the moral virtues or vices to most people. Then, given 
that we have also provisionally accepted the situationist claim that most 
people do not have the virtues or vices, Christianity would be wedded to 
a false commitment.
But in the case of Aristotelian virtue ethics, there is a natural reply to be 
made here to Doris, which I have called the rarity reply.18 It simply denies 
that any form of virtue ethics is committed on descriptive grounds to the 
widespread possession of the virtues. So too in the case of Christianity. 
The Christian can consistently hold—for various reasons such as personal 
sin, original sin, the fall, the Devil and his minions, or a variety of other 
explanatory stories—that most people, including most Christians, do not 
live up to the standards of being even weakly virtuous.19 At the same time, 
Christians can still assert that there has been at least one person (Jesus 
Christ) who did in fact perfectly exhibit the virtues throughout his life, 
and a few other human beings who had characters which made them 
worthy of sainthood or at least of serving as moral exemplars.
I do not see anything in discussions of the rarity reply in the literature 
on virtue ethics that would carry over in a problematic way for Christi-
anity. So (N1) seems to provide little cause for concern at this point. But 
enough, and so forth). Similarly when it comes to other vices like cruelty, apathy, and glut-
tony. Vices are not just absent virtues, in other words, but stable, consistent, and causally 
efficacious dispositions in their own right.
 Now one could understand the vices very differently, as centrally involving dispositions 
to not exhibit cross-situationally consistent virtuous behavior. Hence on this approach I 
would be a dishonest person if I exhibit honesty in some situations but dishonesty in others, 
where there isn’t good moral justification for this inconsistency in behavior.
 Let me briefly say two things about this approach. First, I don’t think it captures com-
monsense thinking about the vices, nor is it a common approach in either the Aristotelian or 
Christian tradition of thinking about character traits. But secondly, if we just want to stipu-
late that ‘vices’ are going to be understood in this way, then I would need to recast much of 
this section of the paper. For then while results from situationism would still cast doubt on 
the widespread possession of the virtues, they would now strengthen the view that most of 
us are vicious. Thanks to Mark Murphy and an anonymous reviewer for helpful discussion 
of these issues.
17Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” 520.
18For extensive discussion, see Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, chapter 8.
19Of course, some of these explanatory stories might be more plausible than others. For-
tunately there is no need to assess them here.
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that is not the end of the story. For we also need to ask whether the rarity 
reply is inconsistent with any central Christian commitments. Let me end 
this section by noting two possibilities that come to mind.
First, note that the rarity reply is formulated in terms of the virtues 
being rare. But the claims arising from situationism in both philosophy 
and psychology would apply to both the virtues and the vices. Dishonesty 
and cruelty, for instance, are both traditionally thought to be character 
traits which, if held, would reliably lead to stable and cross-situationally 
consistent behavior over time. So if Christians are committed to the wide-
spread possession of the vices, then the situationist literature could render 
their descriptive psychology problematic after all.
Have Christians tended to make such a commitment? Here there is 
no simple historical answer to give. Certainly one can find examples of 
Christian writers saying things along these lines in various places, such as 
in some discussions of the doctrine of total depravity. The better question 
here is—what should Christians do if they have made such a commitment?
One option is to challenge the relevant empirical data from psychology, 
or at least the use being made of that data in drawing conclusions about 
our lack of vice. My own view, for what it is worth, is that this is an impor-
tant strategy, to be sure, but also one that will ultimately be unsuccessful. 
For as I have discussed at great length, both the data themselves and the 
inferences on behalf of that data are plausible enough in my view to justify 
a lack of vice thesis.20
Better, then, it seems to me for the Christian to consider abandoning 
a commitment to the view that there is widespread vice, at least barring 
sufficient scriptural warrant for the claim. If there is sufficient scriptural 
warrant, then depending on one’s view of the authority of scripture, it 
should take precedence on this matter and the empirical data will have to 
be reassessed. But if there is scriptural leeway here, then my recommenda-
tion stands that the Christian not affirm that most people are vicious.21
20See Miller, Moral Character and Character and Moral Psychology.
21In a longer discussion, we would need to consider the relationship between the claim 
that most people are not vicious and various formulations of the doctrine of original sin. 
For it might seem that this doctrine entails precisely that most people are vicious. As Calvin 
writes, for instance, “Our nature is not only completely empty of goodness, but so full of 
every kind of wrong that it is always active” (The Institutes of the Christian Religion, 91).
 Briefly, the problem with views like this is that they are demonstrably false on psycho-
logical grounds. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that we have some psychological 
capacities which bring about morally good actions done for morally good reasons. For in-
stance, the psychologist Daniel Batson has shown that our empathetic capacities can lead us 
to help other people in need for altruistic reasons (Altruism in Humans).
 So perhaps not surprisingly, the most plausible formulations of the doctrine of original 
sin, in my view, do not entail that everyone is vicious. Instead, following an excellent recent 
discussion by Michael Rea, I take the heart of the doctrine to be captured by a claim like 
this:
All human beings (except, at most, four) suffer from a kind of corruption that 
makes it very likely that they will fall into sin. (“The Metaphysics of Original Sin,” 
319–356)
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Note that giving up such a commitment to widespread vice would not 
automatically commit Christians to thereby accepting the widespread 
possession of the virtues. Rather, there is both conceptual and, I claim, 
empirical space for a middle ground, as illustrated in Figure 1.
High Moderate Weak Weak Moderate HighCloser to Virtue Closer to Vice
 Virtuous
 Threshold for 
 Virtue
 Threshold for 
 Vice
Neither Virtuous 
Nor Vicious
Most People
 Vicious
 
Figure 1. Where Most People Fall on the Continuum between Perfect Virtue and Perfect Vice.
In other words, the Christian can claim that, as a contingent matter, most 
people today are neither virtuous nor vicious.22
Now what this middle ground looks like with respect to most people is 
an interesting question. Here are some options for fleshing it out:
Most people have local virtues to some degree, which are indexed to 
very specific situations such as honesty in the courtroom or compassion 
in the mall.
Most people have local vices to some degree, which are similarly in-
dexed.23
Most people are continent to some degree, and so they know the mor-
ally right thing to do, face temptation in the opposite direction, but 
reliably and successfully resist it.
But this claim is neutral on whether people have the vices. It is even compatible with the 
possession of the virtues to a weak or moderate degree. Thanks to Tom Flint and Dan Moller 
for pressing me to say something about original sin.
22To avoid a possible worry, note that this diagram is compatible with Aristotelian ap-
proaches to thinking about these matters. Indeed, Aristotle himself held that most people 
occupy a middle ground between virtue and vice (see Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues for 
extensive discussion). Furthermore, Figure 1 fits nicely with the doctrine of the mean if we 
expand it a bit more and add another middle space to the left of the virtue category, and then 
another vice category to the left of it. So you would have (reading from left to right): the vice 
of deficiency, a middle space, the virtue in the middle, another middle space, and the vice 
of excess. 
23For local virtues and vices, see Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” 507–508, 
and Lack of Character, 23, 25, 64. Naturally one could hold a view according to which most 
people have some local virtues and some local vices.
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Most people are incontinent to some degree, and so they know the mor-
ally right thing to do, face temptation in the opposite direction, and 
reliably give into it.
Fortunately we do not need to evaluate these proposals here. The im-
portant point is the possibility of holding that most people occupy this 
middle space.24
Earlier I said there are two ways in which the rarity response might be 
worrisome given a Christian’s other commitments qua Christian. The first 
has to do with whether a lack of vice thesis is acceptable. I claim that it 
is. The second has to do with becoming virtuous. According to the rarity 
response, recall, Christians can reasonably accept that most people are not 
morally virtuous. Suppose this is right. Even so, that clearly cannot be 
the end of the story as far as a Christian approach to character is con-
cerned. For Christians should care strongly about becoming virtuous, or 
more specifically about becoming people of deep faith, love, hope, hon-
esty, wisdom, courage, and all the down the line. So they need to have 
something to say about how to bridge the gap between our present lack 
of virtue and the end goal of becoming virtuous people. More specifically, 
they need to have something to say given the obstacles to virtue that have 
been uncovered in the situationist literature.
Here is a way to spell out the issue in a bit more detail:
(1) An important ethical goal according to Christianity is to become a 
virtuous person.
(2) But most of us fall far short of being virtuous people, as demon-
strated in part by experimental results in psychology.
(3) Hence Christians need to outline realistic and empirically-informed 
ways for most Christians to improve on their non-virtuous charac-
ters, and, at least as far as the situationist literature is concerned, so 
far they have not done so.
(4) Therefore Christians face an important challenge that they need to 
address.
Three quick notes about this argument. First, becoming a virtuous person 
need not be the central goal for Christians. Perhaps something like being 
redeemed, or glorifying God, or becoming children of God, or entering 
into the kingdom of heaven, counts as the central goal. Nevertheless, 
24Incidentally, as noted in n22, this was Aristotle’s own position on the moral character of 
people during his day. For him, “the Many” were better than the vicious, but worse than the 
virtuous. For detailed discussion, see Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues and my “Categorizing 
Character.” For what it is worth, my own view is that most people have what I call “Mixed 
Traits” to some degree, which are cross-situationally consistent and stable over time, but 
are neither traditional moral virtues nor traditional moral vices. These traits are not found 
in ordinary folk thinking about character, and so unfortunately I cannot offer any quick 
examples of them. Hence to avoid needless complexity I have left them off the list above. But 
for details, see my Moral Character and Character and Moral Psychology.
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becoming virtuous is certainly an important goal.25 Second, this argument 
remains neutral on who is causally responsible for the Christian becoming 
virtuous. Perhaps the individual Christian is primarily responsible, or the 
church, or the Holy Spirit. Finally, note that the conclusion is only stated 
as a challenge. It is not stated as anything like an objection or as evidence 
that Christianity is false in some way. For all that has been said up to this 
point, it could be a challenge that is easily met.
I will try to say something more about this challenge at the end of the 
paper. But for now I set aside the rarity reply, and the entire negative side 
of situationism, to turn next to the positive story about what does influ-
ence our behavior.
3. The Positive Side of Situationism in Psychology and Philosophy
The situationist movement in psychology would not have been nearly as 
influential as it was, if it had offered only a negative claim like (N1) about 
cross-situationally consistent traits. Instead a variety of positive claims 
were made as well. Here I will attempt to extract the most influential and 
important ones.
Not only did situationists observe that people seem to exhibit a high de-
gree of cross-situational inconsistency in their trait-relevant behavior, but 
this inconsistency could be brought about by subtle and seemingly insig-
nificant changes in the situation.26 For instance, the presence or absence of 
a request to hurry to another building to give a lecture made a significant 
difference (10 percent versus 63 percent) to whether a seminary student 
would stop along the way to check on someone who was slumped over 
against a wall seemingly in need of help.27 Or recall that finding a dime 
made a significant difference (88 percent versus 4 percent) to whether a 
participant would subsequently help pick up dropped papers.28
These kinds of results tempted some psychologists to think that char-
acter traits and even our mental states and personalities all take a back 
seat to the demands of the situations which confront us during our daily 
lives. This idea gets expressed in stronger and weaker forms by situation-
ists. An extreme version is that:
Extreme Forces: Behavior is entirely a product of situational forces. Per-
sonality does not make any causal contribution.29
25Thus if someone were to object by saying, “What I want to do is God’s will. It isn’t my 
goal to become a virtuous person,” the natural reply is, “Wait, part of God’s will for your life 
is for you to become virtuous.” And there is strong Biblical precedent for this reply. See, e.g., 
Colossians 3:12–14. Thanks to Mark Murphy for raising this objection.
26See Mischel, Personality and Assessment, 24, 177, 293; Mischel, “Toward a Cognitive Social 
Learning Reconceptualization of Personality,” 258–259; and Ross and Nisbett, The Person and 
the Situation, 4–6, 10–11, 46–58.
27Darley and Batson, “‘From Jerusalem to Jericho.’”
28Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness.”
29It is not clear how many psychologists ever endorsed this extreme of a view. Skinner 
came close in places such as the following: “Every discovery of an event which has a part in 
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More restrained than this claim is that:
Strong Forces: Behavior is primarily a product of situational forces. Per-
sonality only has a modest causal contribution to make.30
Now a Christian might worry about each of these claims, and justifiably 
so. For on their surface, they could pose a threat to central Christian com-
mitments about agency, free will, and moral responsibility.
Whether they in fact pose such a threat would be an interesting question 
to consider, and a difficult one to answer. Fortunately, we can sidestep it 
completely. For both Extreme Forces and Strong Forces are false. This is the 
emerging consensus of psychologists in recent decades, and even the most 
prominent figure from the early days of the situationist movement, Walter 
Mischel, has disavowed them.31 But if the claims are false, then Christians 
do not have to worry about what their potential implications might be.
One reason why they are false is that the situations that we encounter 
do not directly produce intentional actions on our part. Rather, their influ-
ence is shaped by the mental states that make up our personalities, i.e., our 
beliefs and desires and the interpretations that we give to situations. The 
causal relationship often goes in the other direction as well; our mental 
states have a significant impact on creating, selecting, and shaping the sit-
uations in which we find ourselves. So my behavior is directly the product 
of the mental forces in my psychology and only indirectly the product 
of situational ones (as they impact my mind), with both forces working 
together in an interactive relationship to produce this output.32
Despite this and other concerns, I do not want to be overly harsh in my 
assessment of the situationist’s positive story about action. In fact, I think 
there is a thesis in the neighborhood that is perfectly reasonable to accept, 
and may provide a more charitable interpretation of the basic situationist 
idea all along:
shaping a man’s behavior seems to leave so much the less to be credited to the man himself; 
and as such explanations become more and more comprehensive, the contribution which 
may be claimed by the individual himself appears to approach zero” (“Freedom and the 
Control of Man,” 52). But the last qualification about approaching zero gives him some wiggle 
room out of a claim like Extreme Forces. See also the relevant discussion in Flanagan, Varieties 
of Moral Personality, 264, and Funder, The Personality Puzzle, 107. If nothing else, though, Ex-
treme Forces helps to set up the next, somewhat more moderate claim, which was widely held 
for a time by psychologists.
30For similar claims and interpretations of situationism, see also Bowers, “Situationism 
in Psychology,” 307–311, 315–316, 319, 326, 328; Epstein, “The Stability of Behavior: I. On 
Predicting Most of the People Much of the Time,” 1099; Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the 
Situation, xiv; and Funder, The Personality Puzzle, 101, 112, 117.
31See, e.g., Mischel, Personality and Assessment, 298–299; Bowers, “Situationism in Psy-
chology,” 329; Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 19, 154–156; and Mischel and 
Shoda, “Toward a Unified Theory of Personality,” 233.
32Much more could be said about these points, but fortunately the discussion in the psy-
chology literature is extensive. See, e.g., the works cited in the previous footnote. I have 
explored this and other reasons for rejecting both Extreme and Strong Forces in detail in Char-
acter and Moral Psychology, chapter 4.
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Surprising Dispositions: The behavior of most individuals tends to be in-
fluenced by various situational forces that activate certain of our mental 
dispositions—certain beliefs, desires, emotions, and the like. Further-
more, the functioning of these dispositions in our minds and especially 
their degree of impact on behavior are often underappreciated by both 
ordinary people and even trained philosophers and psychologists.33
Here are some examples of these dispositions:
Beliefs and desires concerned with harming others in order to maintain 
a positive opinion of myself.34
Beliefs and desires concerned with harming others in order to obey 
instructions from a legitimate authority.35
Desires concerned with helping when doing so will contribute towards 
extending my good mood, and more so than any alternative reasonable 
means of doing so which is thought to be available.36
Desires concerned with not helping when helping is thought to poten-
tially earn the disapproval of those observing me.37
Desires concerned with cheating when the benefits of cheating (signifi-
cantly) outweigh the costs, while also desiring as much as possible to 
still be thought of as an honest person by oneself and others.38
Many other examples could also be given. What is going to be true of all 
these beliefs and desires is that they often operate unconsciously in most 
people, or at least the extent to which they are operative is often not con-
sciously represented. For instance, it is well known that ordinary estimates 
of people’s willingness to obey authority figures in doing horrendous ac-
tions are much lower than is reflected in actual behavior.39 Similarly, it is 
widely accepted by psychologists that fear of earning the disapproval of 
observers plays a significant role in studies of group helping, and yet no-
toriously participants in those studies do not cite the role of unresponsive 
group members in explaining their failures to help.40
33See also Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 46; Flanagan, Varieties of Moral 
Personality, 292; Doris, Lack of Character, 63n5; and Nahmias, “Autonomous Agency and So-
cial Psychology,” 172.
34Baumeister, Smart, and Boden, “Relation of Threatened Egoism to Violence and Ag-
gression,” 5–33.
35Milgram, Obedience to Authority.
36Carlson, Charlin, and Miller, “Positive Mood and Helping Behavior.”
37Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander.
38Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, “The Dishonesty of Honest People.”
39Milgram, Obedience to Authority. For additional situations where participants’ predic-
tions of their moral behavior were significantly out of line with actual behavior, see Balcetis 
and Dunning, “Considering the Situation.”
40Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 124.
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To clarify the thesis above a bit more in light of these examples, it is 
important to stress that the “surprising” part has more to do with the 
impact of these dispositions on our behavior, rather than with their mere 
existence in the first place. Most of us are likely aware that sometimes we 
do not want to do things like helping others when that could merit the 
disapproval of third parties, for instance. But what is surprising to learn 
is that our desires to avoid helping can have such a significant impact 
on our behavior, and often when we do not even realize that they are 
functioning in the first place. Hence I noted in formulating the claim that 
it is especially their degree of impact on behavior that is often under-
appreciated by both ordinary people and even trained philosophers and 
psychologists.
But why should we believe that these Surprising Dispositions are even 
present in the first place in most people? Here situationists in psychology 
point to a number of relevant studies, three of which I already mentioned 
with Dime in the Phone Booth (supporting helping and positive mood 
maintenance), Lady in Distress (supporting not helping and disapproval 
avoidance) and Obedience to Authority (supporting harming and authority 
obedience). Let’s not forget Bathroom either, as the study is used to support 
the existence and influence of a Surprising Disposition related to helping 
and relieving feelings of embarrassment.41
Naturally we can question the inferences involved from the data in 
these studies to the psychological dispositions that are used to explain 
their results. But psychologists are not positing such dispositions on the 
basis of just one study—dozens of studies can be cited as empirical sup-
port for each disposition or set of dispositions. Hence my view is that 
psychologists have indeed provided us with ample empirical evidence to 
support the claim that there are many Surprising Dispositions which are 
widely held and which, when activated or triggered, can have a signifi-
cant impact on our thoughts, motivation, and behavior.42
With this new claim in Surprising Dispositions now on the table, does it 
pose any trouble for central commitments of Christianity? Trouble might 
indeed be lurking in the area of moral responsibility and agency. I con-
sider one potential source of trouble in the next section.
4. Surprising Dispositions and Agency
Suppose that our Surprising Dispositions were to threaten moral respon-
sibility, such that in cases when an action is caused to some degree by one 
of these dispositions, the agent is to that extent not responsible for that 
action. And suppose that the Surprising Dispositions are widespread and 
frequently causally active. Then moral responsibility would be seriously 
diminished. Presumably that would be a conclusion that is unaccept-
able to Christians. For surely on the Christian view, human beings are 
41Cann and Blackwelder, “Compliance and Mood.”
42For detailed discussion, see my Moral Character and Character and Moral Psychology.
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significantly morally responsible most of the time when they lie, cheat, 
steal, assault, rape, or murder—or on the flip side, when they keep their 
promises, tell the truth, love a stranger, or voluntarily sacrifice their lives 
for a good cause. Surely Christians want to say that we should be held 
accountable to a significant degree for such actions, at least in most cases, 
both by other humans and most of all by God.
Why might our Surprising Dispositions threaten moral responsibility? 
One way is via the role of unconscious processing.43 Here is an attempt to 
spell out the connection:
(1) Free and/or morally responsible actions require expressions of 
agency.44
(2) Agential behavior is caused by thoughts which, minimally, are con-
scious.45
(3) Situationism supports the claim that much of our behavior is caused 
by (or at least significantly causally influenced by) thoughts which 
are unconscious, including much of our behavior that pertains to 
matters of ethics such as lying, cheating stealing, helping, and the 
like.46
(4) Therefore, we are justified in believing that much of our behavior, 
including much of our behavior that pertains to matters of ethics, 
is not free and/or morally responsible.47 Or, if it is, the degree to 
which that behavior is free and/or morally responsible is signifi-
cantly diminished from what we ordinarily assume.
This is meant to be a general reconstruction of how a certain line of rea-
soning often goes, while acknowledging that there are differences in the 
43This is by no means the only possible way. Dan Moller and Frances Howard-Snyder, 
for instance, have suggested to me that in light of our Surprising Dispositions, there might 
be serious concerns having to do with luck and moral responsibility. Elsewhere I have also 
considered whether our Surprising Dispositions pose a threat to moral responsibility on a 
reasons-responsive approach (see Nelkin, “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of 
Situationism,” and my “Situationism and Free Will”). Due to limitations of space, I unfortu-
nately cannot consider all of these possibilities here. What follows in the text above, though, 
strikes me as the most serious potential threat.
44In discussions of situationism in the philosophy literature, it is customary to lump talk 
of freedom and moral responsibility together, and I follow this convention here. See, e.g., 
Nelkin “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism,” 183n6.
45A commitment to something like this premise can be found in the work of Harry 
Frankfurt, Michael Bratman, Eleonore Stump, David Velleman, and Laura Ekstrom. For an 
extensive list of references, see my “Identifying with our Desires.” Admittedly, in recent 
years support for this premise has waned, no doubt in part because of increased familiarity 
with research in psychology.
46Some formulations of this premise would add that not only are the thoughts uncon-
scious, but if the agent were to be aware of them, then she would reject them in light of 
her conscious principles and values. See, e.g., Nahmias, “Autonomous Agency and Social 
Psychology,” 170.
47Or at least we are not justified in believing that it is.
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details. Sometimes the argument is put in terms of “agency,” as above, and 
sometimes it is put in terms of “personhood” or “autonomy.”48 The stan-
dards in question for agential behavior vary somewhat in the literature on 
situationism and responsibility too—consciousness of the thoughts giving 
rise to the behavior is one proposed requirement, and others mentioned 
in this context include self-conscious reflection, accurate self-reflection, 
reflective self-direction, reflectively chosen principles, or knowledge of 
reasons.49 Regardless of these differences, if it were to turn out that our be-
havior is significantly causally influenced by unconscious psychological 
states, then on all these proposals, we would not be free and responsible 
in those particular instances, or at least our freedom/responsibility would 
be much diminished.50
Some of the experiments linked to situationism certainly lend support 
to the role of unconscious processing. As already noted, participants in 
group-effect studies such as Lady in Distress typically deny that the pres-
ence of the confederate had any role to play in their not helping.51 People 
emerging from the bathroom presumably were unaware of the influence 
of embarrassment relief, as were people similarly unaware of the role of 
positive mood maintenance in Dime in the Phone Book. The situationist 
claim in Surprising Dispositions is a reflection of these particular studies, 
but also of hundreds of others which call attention to psychological dispo-
sitions that are not well appreciated but which can and often do work at 
the unconscious level in morally relevant ways.52
Potential trouble could lurk here for the Christian, as (4) does not seem 
compatible with central Christian commitments, especially when it comes 
to responsibility before God. But the natural response for the Christian to 
make, and the one that philosophers would likely make anyway regardless 
of their religious commitments, is to just reject premise (2) and broaden 
the standards required for agential behavior so that unconscious mental 
states can still give rise to genuine actions, at least provided certain condi-
tions are also satisfied. What would not be necessary (although it may 
still be sufficient) would be the satisfaction of more sophisticated require-
ments that would not be met in the cases that are of interest here, such 
as acts of reflection, having conscious awareness of reasons, performing 
48For agency, see Doris, “Skepticism about Persons”; Vargas, “Situationism and Moral 
Responsibility,” 330; and especially Mele and Shepherd, “Situationism and Agency.” For per-
sonhood, see Doris, “Skepticism about Persons.” For autonomy, see Nahmias, “Autonomous 
Agency and Social Psychology.”
49Nahmias, “Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology,” 170–171; Doris, “Skepticism 
about Persons,” 59–60; and Mele and Shepherd, “Situationism and Agency,” 62.
50Nahmias, “Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology”; Doris, “Skepticism about Per-
sons”; and Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs, “Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?,” 
333. 
51Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 124.
52Such results link up with a larger literature in social psychology on unconscious auto-
maticity. I have explored some of these connections in Moral Character.
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second-order conscious assessments of desires, forming higher-order voli-
tions, engaging in self-conscious deliberation, or the like.
There are a number of ways to develop this strategy, and here is not the 
place to try to review them. To take one example, a straightforward pro-
posal would be to require only counterfactual endorsement, or roughly 
the idea that if the agent in question were to be made aware of the mental 
states which had unconsciously given rise to her action, then for her ac-
tion to be an expression of her agency, she would reflectively endorse 
those states (or do whatever else the correct standard is supposed to be on 
proposals which require conscious access to the processing that goes into 
behavior).53 Another proposal, which I myself have developed in some 
detail, is to require that there be a subconscious cognitive process which 
pairs the causally relevant unconscious mental states with the agent’s most 
important relevant norms, and when doing so, does not return the output 
that there is an inconsistency between the two. In other words, there is 
psychological harmony between the agent’s values and the particular de-
sires, intentions, and so forth, even if she is not consciously aware of their 
presence in the moment.54
Regardless of the prospects for these particular proposals, developing 
a strategy in this ballpark is one of the most worthwhile research areas in 
contemporary philosophy of action. And it is an area that Christians can 
fruitfully explore.
Suppose, then, that an account of responsible, agential behavior can be 
developed which is compatible with the causal influence of Surprising Dis-
positions. The Christian can thereby continue to be justified in believing 
in free and morally responsible actions even when those dispositions are 
at work. But a new concern now arises. Instead of focusing on the status 
of the action that is performed, this new concern focuses on the agent’s 
ability to report what his or her reasons were for so acting. To see the con-
cern, I need to do a bit of stage-setting.
In contrast to rationalist approaches which dominated moral psy-
chology several decades ago, there has been a robust consensus in the 
psychology literature that most of our moral judgments and subsequent 
actions are not preceded by a process of conscious deliberation. So when 
I express a particular moral judgment, perhaps by saying, “Leaving the 
children in the car for two hours in the sweltering parking lot was wrong,” 
it is rare that I would have given the matter much conscious thought be-
forehand; rather the judgment just spontaneously arises within me, and 
then I act by (in this case) verbally expressing it. So it has seemed to many 
psychologists recently that the following is true:
53See Bratman, “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason,” 204 for a similar ap-
proach.
54See my “Identifying with Our Desires.” For another approach, see Doris, Lack of Char-
acter, 140–142 and his critical discussion of reflective approaches to agency in “Skepticism 
about Persons.” 
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Absence of Conscious Reasoning: Moral judgments are typically not 
caused by a prior process of conscious moral reasoning or deliberation 
that led to the formation of those judgments.55
What about after the judgment is made? At that point if you asked me 
why I took such a stance on the wrongness of the children’s treatment, I 
can easily cite all kinds of both general and more specific moral principles 
(“Children should not suffer,” “Leaving children unattended in cars is 
wrong,” “It was cruel of that parent to abandon his children in the car,” 
and so on). So it seems that the following is also true:
Post-Judgment Conscious Reasoning: People often engage in conscious 
moral reasoning and appeal to various reasons and principles after 
they have formed a moral judgment.56
Given this background, the new concern arising from the influence of our 
Surprising Dispositions can now be introduced. For a threat of skepticism 
looms about whether our appeals to reasons and principles are veridical.
Recall that when our Surprising Dispositions are causally active in 
moral judgment formation and subsequent behavior, it is rare that we 
would cite them after the fact when justifying our judgments. We already 
said that participants in the early group effect studies did not cite the role 
of unresponsive group members in explaining their failures to help. In 
fact, they tended to cite all kinds of reasons other than what were some of 
the most causally operative ones.57 Perhaps there will be occasions where, 
having studied psychology in school for instance, we might recognize the 
contribution that a Surprising Disposition made in a given instance of 
judgment formation. But these occasions will not be the norm.
To make things more concrete, consider the bathroom situation again 
from Cann and Blackwelder’s study. Suppose you are exiting the bath-
room, and are approached to carry some papers down the hallway. And 
suppose that you find yourself immediately forming the judgment that you 
should help the stranger in this way. Later, when asked why you thought 
that you should do this, you respond by saying that it is important to do 
55See, e.g., Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail,” 818–820 and Haidt and 
Bjorklund, “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology,” 189. We can 
follow Haidt and Bjorklund’s account of a conscious process as a process which is “inten-
tional, effortful, and controllable and that the reasoner is aware that it is going on” (189; see 
also Haidt, “The Emotional Dog,” 818).
 The scope of this claim about moral judgments is meant to range broadly, so as to include 
first-person, second-person, and third-person moral judgments, as well as moral judgments 
about the past, present, and future. Clearly there will be individual differences in such mat-
ters—some people might consciously deliberate more about the moral behavior of third 
parties than they do about what they themselves should do, for instance.
 Having said this, the main focus in the rest of the paper will be on first- and third-person 
moral judgments concerning present actions.
56See, e.g., Haidt and Bjorklund, “Social Intuitionists,” 189.
57Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 124. See also Nisbett and Wilson, “Telling 
More Than We Can Know,” 241, who cite the group effect research in the context of making 
similar points to what follows.
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kind things for others from time to time, and this was one such time. As a 
matter of fact, though, what primarily caused you to form this judgment 
was a desire to relieve embarrassment together with a belief that helping 
to carry the papers would serve as a reasonable means to do so. These 
mental states were causally operative at the unconscious level, though, 
and so you did not recognize the robust role that they played.
In such an instance, you would be guilty of confabulating. The justifiers 
for the judgment that you do cite did not in fact play a causal role; you 
made up a role for them that they did not actually play. And this could be 
true for a number of our moral judgments and actions.
Now this is not quite the skeptical worry I have in mind, although wide-
spread confabulation itself would be bad news indeed. But the skeptical 
worry is that, given the reasonable possibility of such confabulation, our 
justification is threatened for thinking that we have accurately discerned 
our reasons for judgment and action. More precisely:
Skepticism about our Reasons for Forming Moral Judgments: Given the 
frequently unconscious causal role of Surprising Dispositions, in any 
given instance where a moral judgment is formed spontaneously and 
immediately without conscious deliberation, the agent in question has 
no reasonable basis upon which to discern what her actual reasons 
were for forming the judgment.
So in the bathroom example, I would have no reasonable basis upon 
which to discern whether my judgment in favor of helping stemmed from 
a moral principle or a desire to alleviate feelings of embarrassment (or 
both). Each could adequately explain why I formed the judgment, and yet 
the role of each is outside my conscious purview. I am left in the dark as to 
which one was really at work.58
Now one could figure this out. For instance, one could put oneself in 
other situations where the moral principle would apply but no embar-
rassment is involved, and then see whether the principle gives rise to the 
same judgment. But clearly this is not a reasonable approach for ordinary 
people to engage in so as to discern their true motivating reasons. For one 
thing, it would be extremely time-consuming to try and implement. Not 
to mention that even if one did discern what the true motivating reasons 
were in a particular instance, the same question will arise all over again for 
the next morally relevant situation which one confronts, perhaps just a few 
more minutes later in the day. Hence one’s entire day could easily become 
consumed with following this approach.
Note that the above claim allows that sometimes our moral principles 
really did do the causal work in generating a moral judgment. Surprising 
58For a similar concern, see Doris, Lack of Character, 139. For related discussion, see Brink, 
“Situationism, Responsibility, and Fair Opportunity,” 142 and, in psychology, the very inter-
esting studies and relevant discussion in Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, and Ditto, “The 
Motivated Use of Moral Principles,” 476–491, especially 489. I develop these themes in more de-
tail in Miller, “Assessing Two Competing Approaches to the Psychology of Moral Judgments.”
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Dispositions had no role to play. Objectively speaking, if the person accu-
rately reports these moral principles, then he is not confabulating. But this 
is beside the point in this discussion, since we are wondering about ques-
tions of epistemic justification. Whatever the psychological reality might be, 
the actor at the time won’t have any reasonable way of determining it 
and so will not be justified in believing that his principles were causally 
responsible. In citing those principles, he may be right on a given occasion 
in thinking that they were the main causes, but this would only be because 
he was lucky and his belief was correct by accident.59 He is not able to reli-
ably track the truth in this regard. Hence there will be other cases where it 
also seems equally as clear that principles were causally responsible, but 
in fact now it was the Surprising Dispositions that were. And he would 
not be able to tell the two cases apart from the inside, at least using any 
reasonable means in his ordinary daily life.
What follows normatively if the skeptical claim above is correct? The 
main lesson I see is that rather than forming beliefs about what the rea-
sons are for why we make our spontaneous moral judgments, we should 
instead withhold offering any such reasons, unless we can reliably discern 
whether it was principles or Surprising Dispositions that are doing the 
causal work. Since most of us cannot reliably discern this in any reason-
able way, it follows that most of us should be agnostic about why we make 
the particular moral judgments we do.
Let me clarify this claim about withholding some more. The main lesson 
is not that we should give up our spontaneously formed moral judgments. 
It can still be appropriate for me to believe that leaving the children in the 
car for two hours was wrong. Furthermore, it is not that we should refrain 
from subsequently thinking about, and offering to others, a variety of im-
portant justificatory reasons for our spontaneous moral judgments. I might, 
after the fact, cite the suffering of the children and the high risk of death as 
reasons for why it was wrong to leave them in the car. And those might be 
exactly the reasons for why such behavior is, in fact, morally wrong. But 
what I should refrain from doing, according to the above line of reasoning, is 
think (and report to others) that these justificatory reasons were the actual 
reasons for which I formed the moral judgment in the first place. They might 
have been. Or instead the judgment might have been formed primarily 
due to one or more Surprising Dispositions. Or perhaps it arose from a 
basic disgust reaction. Since we are typically not in a reasonable position 
to figure this out, the normative recommendation is that we should refrain 
from reporting on why we formed our moral judgments in these cases.
This is a radically revisionary consequence. If followed, it would make 
for a sharp departure from the phenomenological experience of effort-
lessly citing various reasons for which (we think) we made our moral 
judgments. I suspect it is also a consequence that would be very difficult 
59For a similar idea in the psychological literature, see Nisbett and Wilson, “Telling More 
Than We Can Know,” 233.
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to implement in practice—we just naturally and spontaneously offer such 
reasons to ourselves and others. Finally, it is a consequence that Christians 
might be loath to accept. But for all that it still seems to be the correct 
consequence to draw at this point.
So have we finally arrived at a deeply troubling consequence of situ-
ationism for Christianity? Here I grant that we have arrived at a deeply 
troubling consequence. But it is not a consequence that is deeply trou-
bling for Christians qua Christians. In other words, there is nothing specific 
about Christian commitments themselves that plays a role in this skeptical 
outcome. Rather, this is (or at least should be) a deeply troubling conse-
quence for all of us, regardless of our religious outlooks.
So once again Christians, at least qua Christians, are able to emerge 
from this discussion fairly unscathed, albeit perhaps at the same time 
joining others in feeling uneasy.
5. Tying the Negative and Positive Stories Together
We have seen that there are many different claims associated with situ-
ationism in both philosophy and psychology, and also many different 
implications that could be drawn from them. Throughout this paper, I 
have tried to suggest some defensive maneuvers that Christians could use 
in order to avoid the potentially troubling implications. In the process, a 
picture of moral psychology has begun to emerge which has the following 
parameters:
Most people today do not have the moral virtues such as honesty or 
compassion.
Most people today do not have the moral vices such as dishonesty or 
cruelty.
Instead, most people today tend to be influenced by various situ-
ational forces, which can activate certain of their mental dispositions 
the functioning and degree of impact of which on behavior are often 
underappreciated.
Despite the frequent lack of conscious awareness about their func-
tioning and degree of impact, these dispositions are such that we can 
still exhibit agency when we act on the basis of them and be morally 
responsible for those actions.
But in cases where we do not engage in conscious deliberation before 
forming a moral judgment and acting, most people have no reasonable 
basis upon which to discern what their actual reasons were for forming 
the judgment.
It seems to me that this picture is one that can be reasonably accepted by 
Christians, in the sense that none of their other Christian commitments 
need conflict with it.
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Indeed, it could be argued that this picture is what one might expect 
from a moral psychology informed by a reading of the New Testament. 
Consider, for instance, the following passages:
For everything God created is good. (1 Timothy 4:1)
There is no one righteous, not even one. (Romans 3:10)
I do not understand what I do. (Romans 7:15)
Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin 
living in me that does it. (Romans 7:20)
I see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against 
the law of my mind. (Romans 7:23)
He [the Lord] will bring to light what is hidden in darkness and will expose 
the motives of men’s hearts. At that time each will receive his praise from 
God. (1 Corinthians 3:10)
The spirit is willing, but the body is weak. (Matthew 26: 41)
For the word of God . . . judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart. Noth-
ing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight. Everything is uncovered and 
laid bare before the eyes of him to whom we must give account. (Hebrews 4:8)
In fact, the picture of moral psychology outlined by the New Testament 
seems to fit much more comfortably with the latest empirical research 
than do many other pictures outlined in the history of both philosophy 
and psychology, especially in the rationalist tradition.
And not only does the New Testament seem to outline an empirically 
viable approach to moral psychology, it also describes various resources 
for improvement too. These resources can be marshalled as a basis for 
addressing the challenge I raised in Section 2. Recall that the key premise 
of that challenge was the following:
(3) Christians need to outline realistic and empirically informed ways 
for most Christians to improve on their non-virtuous character, 
and, at least as far as the situationist literature is concerned, so far 
they have not done so.
Here is not the place to try to outline a Christian approach to character 
improvement, but let me at least mention three particular resources that 
seem worth special consideration by Christians in light of the situationist 
literature.60
The first is the emphasis on positive rituals and practices. When carried 
out in the appropriate ways and in the right contexts, they can mold a 
Christian’s psychology in such a way as to foster the formation of virtuous 
habits. More specifically, they can both help direct her attention to the 
relevant moral considerations and orient her motives in the right way to 
respond to them. Familiar examples include praying, contemplating scrip-
60In the next two paragraphs I have benefitted from unpublished work by Rico Vitz.
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ture and the life of the saints, fasting, confessing sins, giving to charity, 
tithing to the church, and volunteering. Through repeated practice, these 
behaviors can become automatic, and can override Surprising Disposi-
tions that might motivate action in an opposing direction.
But this performance of rituals and practices does not typically happen 
alone in a Christian’s life. Rather, such practices are carried out liturgi-
cally in a social context. Christians pray together, read scripture together, 
confess together, and even discipline each other together. Throughout the 
long process of character formation, the Christian can benefit from the 
advice, experience, and admonitions of others, especially but not only the 
church leaders.
Admittedly, it is an empirical question whether these approaches to 
character improvement are actually efficacious. Here is not the place to 
review the relevant experimental literature, which unfortunately is fairly 
thin. Instead my only claim for now is that these approaches make sense 
from a Christian perspective and are not threatened, as far as I can see, by 
the reasonable lessons to be drawn from the situationist literature.
Finally, there is the internal working of the Holy Spirit. It has been a tra-
ditional claim of Christian thinking that the Holy Spirit is active in some 
way in the life of the believer to causally affect the process of character 
development and sanctification. Exactly what form such involvement 
takes is a controversial and perhaps ultimately inscrutable matter,61 but 
presumably one contribution the Holy Spirit can make is to address the 
deepest recesses of the Christian’s mind and work towards weakening the 
influence of non-virtuous moral dispositions.
So it turns out that Christians, far from being threatened by the news 
from situationist psychology and philosophy, may be uniquely poised 
to address some of the additional challenges from situationism which, it 
now seems, we all must face in trying to become people of virtue.62
Wake Forest University
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